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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Our current transplant regime is a qualified failure. Transplant operations 
have been basically flat for the last eight years. In 2013, over 4300 people died 
while waiting and about 3000 were permanently removed from the queue 
because they developed a medical condition that precluded transplant.1 
Twenty-seven years ago, the average wait for a deceased-donor kidney in 
the United States was about one year; now, the average wait is approaching five 
years.2 In many parts of the country it has reached a ten-year wait from listing to 
transplant—if one can survive that long.3 
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 1.  Health Res. & Servs. Admin., National Data Reports January 1995–May 31, 2014, ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp 
(last visited Sep. 7, 2014) (When accessing this source, in “Choose Category,” input “Waiting List 
Removals,” and in “Choose Organ,” input “Kidney.” In “Step 2,” follow “Removal Reasons by 
Year.”).  
 2.  Fred P. Sanfilippo et al., Factors Affecting the Waiting Time of Cadaveric Kidney Transplant 
Candidates in the United States, 267 JAMA 247, 249 (citing a median of 11.3 months), available at 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=394408; see also Jackie Carr, New Clinic Offers 
Access to Shorter Wait List for Kidney Transplantation, UC SAN DIEGO NEWS CTR (Feb. 18, 2010),  
http://ucsdnews.ucsd.edu/archive/newsrel/health/02-18ShorterWaitList.asp (citing a five to seven–year 
wait in 2010).   
 3.  See Benjamin Hippen, Preventive Measures May Not Reduce the Demand for Kidney 
Transplantation. There Is Reason to Suppose This Is Not the Case, 70 KIDNEY INT’L 606 (2006); Robert 
M. Merion et al., Deceased-Donor Characteristics and the Survival Benefit of Kidney Transplantation, 
294 JAMA 2726 (2005); Akinlolu O. Ojo et al., Survival in Recipients of Marginal Cadaveric Donor 
Kidneys Compared with Other Recipients and Wait-Listed Transplant Candidates, 12 J. AM. SOC’Y 
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Maximizing deceased donation, although a worthy effort, is not a definitive 
solution to the organ shortage. Of the roughly two million Americans who die 
annually, only 10,500 to 13,800, representing less than one percent of all deaths 
each year, possess organs healthy enough for transplanting.4 Moreover, when 
unaware of the preference of their loved ones, only about half of families give 
permission for the organs to be retrieved at death.5 The number of deceased 
donors in 2012 as reported by the United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS)—about 7400—is consistent with these realities.6 The built-in constraint 
on the number of potentially transplantable posthumous kidneys also 
underscores why a “presumed-consent” law7 is unlikely to yield the huge 
windfall of transplantable kidneys that would be needed to solve our organ 
shortage.8 More is needed. 
In order to address the organ shortage, its cause must first be determined. 
The woeful inadequacy of organ-procurement policy lies in its ideological 
bedrock: the notion that altruism—that is, sacrifice without expectation of 
material reciprocation or enrichment—is the only legitimate motive for 
donating an organ. 
Bearing this cause in mind, solving the organ shortage becomes an 
achievable task. The remedy to the shortage lies in modifying the de facto 
enrichment ban.9 This is not as difficult as it may at first seem, because the de 
facto ban, even if purportedly justified by altruism, is not as cemented in actual 
law as its proponents claim. To be sure, the law as it is currently understood 
does ban donor enrichment.10 But, as explained below, full prohibition is 
unsupported by the relevant statute, which, accurately understood, should 
 
NEPHROLOGY 589 (2001). 
 4.  Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United States, 349 
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 667, 667 (2003); Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L 
VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at 1, 5. 
 5.  Sheehy, supra note 4, at 667.  
 6.  COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ORGAN 
DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 100 (James F. Childress & Catharyn T. Liverman eds. 
2006); see Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Organ Datasource, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & 
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/organDatasource/ (last visited Sep. 7, 
2014). 
 7.  A presumed-consent law is a law that presumes all individuals to be organ donors at death 
unless they explicitly indicate otherwise. 
 8.  Kieran Healy, Do Presumed Consent Laws Raise Organ Procurement Rates?, 55 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1017 (2006). Furthermore, although European countries with presumed-consent (also known as 
opt-out) policies did enjoy a boost in cadaveric-kidney supply after the policy was implemented, it is 
unclear whether their success was due to the new policies itself or to the simultaneous investment made 
in procurement infrastructure. To be sure, a presumed-consent strategy has merit. Another plan known 
as “forward” payment (wherein individuals arrange to have their organs taken at death in exchange for 
a payment to their estate or family) is also worth considering, but is beyond the scope of this article.  
 9.  See generally WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY 
DONORS (Sally Satel ed., 2008). 
 10.  Jed Adam Gross, Note, E Pluribus Unos: The National Organ Transplant Act and its 
Postoperative Complications, 8 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 145, 179–80 (2008) (quoting S. Res. 
251, 98th Cong. (1983)). 
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prohibit only bargained-for commercial exchanges. The statute should not 
prevent states from providing reasonable, noncommercial, gratuitous incentives 
to organ donors. 
 
Figure: Patients on the Kidney Waiting List vs. Annual Transplant Operations11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before explaining why donor enrichment is not fully prohibited by law, a 
brief reminder of the stakes is appropriate. Consider this scenario: A good-
Samaritan donor shows up at his local transplant center offering a kidney to the 
next person on the center’s list. He passes all the screening tests, signs consent 
forms, and undergoes surgery. His act allows a debilitated person to resume his 
or her full, active role as a spouse, parent, and worker. The donor is nothing less 
than someone’s savior. Under current law, however, if he accepts some kind of 
tangible benefit for his act, he is considered a criminal. Even if the largesse he 
receives—perhaps a contribution to his retirement account, a generous tax 
credit, or in-state tuition for his child (or perhaps payments to defray burial 
costs if he donated at death)—does not come from the patient whose life he 
 
      11.    See Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Current Waiting List, Candidates, Overall by Organ, ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp 
(in “Choose Category” input “Waiting List,” select “Candidates”; in “Step 2” follow “Overall by 
Organ.”) (last visited Nov. 18, 2008); Health Res. & Servs. Admin., U.S. Transplants Performed: Jan. 1, 
1988–Dec. 31, 2013, Kidney, All Donor Types, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION 
NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp (in “Choose Category” input 
“Transplant,” in “Choose Organ” input “Kidney.” In “Step 2” follow “Transplants by Donor Type”). 
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saved, but from a federal or state government, the standard interpretation of 
the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) is that the donor has violated the 
law. Likewise, no matter that a noncash reward would not appeal to a person in 
desperate need of financial help who would want quick money rather than a 
delayed in-kind reward. Never mind that a months-long waiting period would 
dampen impulsivity, allowing ample time for any potential donor to undergo 
detailed education about the procedure, in addition to careful medical and 
psychological screening. Not to mention that participants in a donor-enrichment 
program would receive quality follow-up care, a form of protection that the 
current system does not guarantee to donors. And forget that the general 
climate of opinion regarding donor compensation as revealed in polls is 
generally positive.12 Regardless of all these factors, the prevailing impression of 
section 301 of NOTA is that it prohibits any and all enrichment, even if the 
enrichment is offered as a gratuity by the state rather than by the patient. 
In this article, we conclude that section 301’s proscription against “valuable 
consideration” should not prohibit state-government programs providing 
reasonable incentives for organ donation. The prohibition ought only apply to 
activity that is clearly and definitely commercial. All else, ideally, should be 
allowed. 
We recognize, nevertheless, that there would likely be limits to the amount 
and structure of a state benefit for organ donation beyond which a reasonable 
person would believe an organ to be given in exchange for the payment of the 
state benefit—in other words, that a business-type inducement occurred, akin to 
 
 12.  Polls and surveys reveal four trends: (1) among the general public, the majority either endorses 
in-kind donor rewards or is neutral, (2) the number of people who report that incentives make donation 
appear more attractive to them outnumber those who say that an incentive option would make them 
less likely to donate, (3) youthful cohorts are more receptive to incentives than their older counterparts, 
and (4) the public is more amenable to the idea than are medical professionals. See Satel, supra note 9, 
at 154–57; see also REASON-RUPE, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY: MARCH 2012 TOPLINE RESULTS (2012), 
available at http://reason.com/assets/db/13327728509738.pdf; Karise Carrillo, Examining Attitudes on 
Organ Donation for Transplant: Amenability to Financial Incentives and Donor Benefits, 3 MCNAIR 
SCHOLARS RES. J. 1 (2010); Scott D. Halpern et al., Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 358 (2010); Harry L. 
Humphries et al., Framing the Gift of Life: An Empirical Examination of Altruism, Social Distance and 
Material Incentives in Non-Directed Kidney Donor Motivation, 31 J. NEPHROLOLOGY SOC. WORK 20 
(2009); J.D. Jasper et al., Altruism, Incentives and Organ Donation: Attitudes of the Transplant 
Community 42 MED. CARE 378 (2004); S. Leider & A.E. Roth, Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and 
Why, 10 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1221 (2010); Ken Resnicow et al., Development of a Scale to 
Measure African American Attitudes toward Organ Donation, 17 J. HEALTH & PSYCHOL. 389 (2012); 
J.R. Rodrigue et al., Stimulus for Organ Donation: A Survey of the American Society of Transplant 
Surgeons Membership, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2172 (2009); Alison J. Wellington & Edward A. 
Sayre, An Evaluation of Financial Incentive Policies for Organ Donations in the United States, 29 
CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 1 (2011; Scott Hensley, Poll: Americans Show Support For Compensation of 
Organ Donors, NPR (May 16, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/05/16/152498553/ 
poll-americans-show-support-for-compensation-of-organ-donors. By 1991, the subject of the organ 
shortage was sufficiently familiar for a CNN–Time Yankelovich poll to ask people what they would do 
if they “or a close relative had a fatal disease that could possibly be cured by the transplant.” 
CNN/Time Yankelovich, “The Ethical Questions of Organ Donation,” survey conducted June 4–5, 
1991. Fifty-six percent of respondents say they would “purchase the necessary organ or tissue.” Id. 
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a clear commercial activity. Our purpose is neither to argue for or against the 
validity of such a limit nor establish its boundary, if it exists. Rather, our 
purpose is to assert only that a state benefit made within the bounds of 
reasonableness and given as a gratuity or incentive crafted to underscore a 
noncommercial, public-policy purpose should not be barred by NOTA. We 
suggest specific features of a benefit program that should insulate donations 
from being designated as commercial. 
In reaching the conclusion that NOTA should not ban incentives outright 
(particularly not state incentives), we interpret the actual text of the 1984 
NOTA13 and then consider the Act’s legislative history and the policy concerns 
that motivated it, as well as interpretive canons, federalist principles, and 
interpretations by other pertinent entities. Our analysis of the legislative history 
and policies behind NOTA section 301 shows that NOTA’s prohibition was 
meant to protect against monetary commercial exchanges, such as those 
between patient–buyers, donor–sellers, and profiteering middlemen. 
Government disbursements that are intended as gratuities or incentives 
advancing a public-policy purpose fall outside the language and intent of 
NOTA section 301(a). Moreover, state benefits easily address concerns 
originally raised during the debate over inserting the section 301(a) ban. State-
benefit programs should therefore not be prohibited under NOTA. 
We find further support for this less restrictive view of NOTA section 301 in 
the relevant rules of statutory interpretation and construction, as well as in 
broad federalist principles, and in interpretations reached by other relevant 
entities. The rule of lenity and principles of federalism both support the idea 
that NOTA section 301 should be read narrowly, as allowing (by not 
prohibiting) state-benefit programs. A broader normative view of federalism 
should make courts hesitant to preempt state authority in devising public 
policy–driven efforts to provide benefits to organ donors, where not directly in 
conflict with federal law. Preemption would intrude on the state’s fundamental 
ability to decide how fiscal burdens and benefits are distributed among its 
citizens—its treatment of citizens who donate organs and those who do not. 
Latitude should be granted to state governments in enacting organ donor–
benefit programs. Allowing the development of state approaches to organ-
donation incentives creates the chance to use varying state legal regimes as 
laboratories to test change, allowing reform efforts to be tested fairly quickly. 
Finally, this conclusion is supported by the analysis of the scope of section 
301(a) put forth by the U.S. Department of Justice in the context of paired 
kidney exchange programs. 
Of course, whether or not NOTA section 301 has been properly interpreted 
as broadly banning donor enrichment, it undeniably has been read that way, at 
least by some. Thus, our statutory arguments may be of limited use in solving 
the actual problem on the ground. This unfortunate reality is made all too clear 
 
 13.  42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
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by an examination of Pennsylvania’s funeral-voucher subsidy, whereby donors 
would be enriched via a burial subsidy that would be paid by the state directly 
to a funeral home. Even though NOTA’s applicability to the law was at best 
dubious, the law nonetheless failed—even after passage—due to legal concerns 
about NOTA. This bit of history confirms that, whatever the proper 
interpretation of NOTA section 301 actually is at present, the best course 
forward requires clarification of the law, either through obtaining an official 
opinion from the U. S. Department of Justice definitively interpreting the law in 
the context of state incentive programs or via amendment of the law. 
We argue for clarification of the law through an opinion by the U.S. 
Department of Justice [DOJ] Office of Legal Counsel [OLC], whose 
responsibility it is to provide written opinions and advice to the various agencies 
of the federal executive branch. Definitive interpretation of the federal NOTA 
statutory restriction on transferring human organs for valuable consideration 
would come within the OLC’s jurisdiction upon request by an appropriate 
federal agency, as was done with the issue of paired kidney exchanges. A similar 
request of the DOJ’s OLC should be made regarding state incentive programs. 
Moreover, clarification via amendment would be beneficial in clarifying the 
scope of NOTA section 301. Congress should amend NOTA to explicitly 
exempt state-benefit programs. Precedent for congressional action exists in the 
form of the Charlie W. Norwood Paired Donation Act of 2007 (Norwood 
Act),14 which amended NOTA to clarify that it did not prohibit organ 
exchanges. NOTA clarification through either a DOJ formal opinion or 
legislative amendment is undoubtedly the best way forward. It might even be 
the only way forward if we want to solve our organ shortage. 
II 
“VALUABLE CONSIDERATION” REFERS TO COMMERCIAL ENDEAVORS 
In our tripartite system, the legislature is the primary lawmaking branch of 
government, exercising its will within the limits of its constitutional authority 
and through the medium of statutory law.15 Courts, in contrast, adjudicate 
controversies by interpreting and applying the law.16 The objective in 
interpreting any statute is to effectuate statutory purpose—to discover and give 
meaning to what the legislature intended through the language it used in the 
statute.17 Such interpretation always begins with the text of the law being 
 
 14.  Pub. L. No. 110-144, 121 Stat. 1813 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273b, 274e (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2011)). 
 15.  See Separation of Power—An Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last 
visited Sep. 7, 2014). 
 16. See id. 
 17.  YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 3 (2008) [hereinafter STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS].  
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reviewed.18 
If the language of a statute is clear, there is no need to look to other sources 
to interpret it.19 If, however, there is uncertainty in the language, other rules of 
interpretation and outside sources come into play.20 Section 301 of NOTA 
requires such clarifying analysis. As the relevant parts of the section stipulate, 
(a) Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or 
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human 
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce. The preceding sentence 
does not apply with respect to human organ paired donation. 
(b) Penalties. Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not 
more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
(c) Definitions. For purposes of subsection (a) of this section: 
(1) The term “human organ” means the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, 
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and 
any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus) 
specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation. 
(2) The term “valuable consideration” does not include the reasonable payments 
associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, 
quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and 
lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of 
the organ. 
(3) The term “interstate commerce” has the meaning prescribed for it by section 
321(b) of Title 21. 
(4) The term ‘human organ paired donation’ means the donation and receipt of 
human organs under the following circumstances: 
(A) An individual (referred to in this paragraph as the ‘first donor’) desires to make a 
living donation of a human organ specifically to a particular patient (referred to in this 
paragraph as the ‘first patient’), but such donor is biologically incompatible as a donor 
for such patient. 
(B) A second individual (referred to in this paragraph as the ‘second donor’) desires 
to make a living donation of a human organ specifically to a second particular patient 
(referred to in this paragraph as the ‘second patient’), but such donor is biologically 
incompatible as a donor for such patient. 
(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the first donor is biologically compatible as a donor 
of a human organ for the second patient, and the second donor is biologically 
compatible as a donor of a human organ for the first patient. 
(D) If there is any additional donor-patient pair as described in subparagraph (A) or 
(B), each donor in the group of donor-patient pairs is biologically compatible as a 
donor of a human organ for a patient in such group. 
(E) All donors and patients in the group of donor-patient pairs (whether 2 pairs or 
more than 2 pairs) enter into a single agreement to donate and receive such human 
organs, respectively, according to such biological compatibility in the group. 
(F) Other than as described in subparagraph (E), no valuable consideration is 
knowingly acquired, received, or otherwise transferred with respect to the human 
 
 18.  Id. at 2.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 40. 
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organs referred to in such subparagraph.
21
 
The question at hand is: does a state-provided benefit associated with, and 
made subsequent to, the donation of a human organ constitute a transfer of the 
organ for “valuable consideration” in violation of NOTA section 301(a)?22 
If a word or phrase is specifically defined in statute, then that definition 
controls.23 Although NOTA section 301(a) proscribes the transfer of human 
organs for “valuable consideration,” it does not explicitly define that term. 
While section 301 includes the term “valuable consideration” in its definitions 
section, it sets forth only select examples of what the term does not include: 
“reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation, 
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human 
organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor 
of a human organ in connection with the donation of the organ.”24 
NOTA’s text thus gives guidance in the negative but does not describe the 
nature and character of “valuable consideration.” However, the text offers 
absolutely no support for the conclusion that anything not specifically excluded 
by the express language of NOTA section 301 must be deemed consideration, 
and therefore prohibited. 
If left undefined by the statute in which it appears, a word or phrase that has 
a specific technical meaning elsewhere in the law will be deemed to bring with it 
that accepted and well-established meaning.25 The U.S. Supreme Court has said, 
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition 
and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of 
ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it 
was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise 
instructed. In such a case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction 
with widely accepted definitions, not as departure from them.26 
This principle sheds considerable light on the meaning of NOTA section 
301(a). “Consideration” is a word whose meaning is firmly rooted in contract 
law: It refers to a bargained-for exchange between parties that serves as the 
 
 21.  42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). Sean Arthurs cites recent Supreme Court rulings 
that might put intrastate markets beyond the scope of federal legislation. See Sean Arthurs, No More 
Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model Congress Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of 
our National Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. R. 1101 (2005).  
 22.  See generally Rick K. Jones, The Gift of Life and “Diseases of Language”: Recovering a Lost 
Distinction in Effectuating the Purpose of the National Organ Transplant Act’s Prohibition on the 
Transfer of Human Organs for Valuable Consideration, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1067 (2007) (explaining what 
constitutes valuable consideration under NOTA). 
 23.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, supra note 17, 
at 5. 
 24.  42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 25.  See STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, supra note 
17, at 6 n.23. (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (“Where a 
common law principle is well established . . . the courts may take it as a given that Congress has 
legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the 
contrary is evident.’”)). 
 26.  Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). 
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basis for an enforceable contract.27 It is a term of commerce and signifies an 
exchange that is mutually induced.28 Consideration is not a component of 
gratuitous transfers, in which one party gives something of value independent of 
receiving anything in return.29 Given this well-established meaning, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the idea of “valuable consideration” in NOTA was 
meant to apply to bargained-for, contract-type commercial arrangements and 
not to state-benefit programs, which are designed to provide a gratuity or 
advance other noncommercial, public-policy objectives. This conclusion about 
the meaning of valuable consideration is further supported by the legislative 
history of NOTA, its background purposes, application of canons of statutory 
interpretation and construction, principles of federalism, and de facto 
enforcement of NOTA section 301. These supporting factors are examined in 
turn in the subparts that follow. 
A. The Legislative History of NOTA Section 301(a) Is Buying and Selling 
Focused 
The specific legislative history behind the insertion of section 301’s 
prohibition can be used to shed light on congressional intent.30 The legislative 
history of NOTA section 301 supports the notion that it was meant to apply 
only to bargained-for, contract-type commercial arrangements. The prohibition 
was a straightforward legislative response to a plan by an infamous physician—
H. Barry Jacobs—to buy organs from individuals flown in from Third World 
countries and sell them to patients in need. Dr. Jacobs charged the patients, or 
Medicare, a $2,000 to $5,000 fee for his service.31 The legislative history, though 
replete with denunciations of commercial transactions of this kind, is largely 
silent on other kinds of compensatory transactions.32 
The first evidence that NOTA was a response to Dr. Jacobs’s plan lies in the 
legislation’s early drafts. Those drafts were largely silent on payment for organs 
and instead concentrated on the creation of a nationwide procurement and 
distribution system for organs. And, at one of the early NOTA hearings in the 
House, Al Gore, then the Tennessee congressman spearheading the legislation, 
spoke approvingly of “the provision of incentives, such as a [presumably third-
party] voucher system or a tax credit to a donor’s estate” if “efforts to improve 
voluntary donation are unsuccessful.”33 
 
 27.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1979). 
 28.  See id. § 71(2) (explaining requirement of mutual promises). 
 29.  Id. § 71 cmt. b. 
 30.  See STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, supra note 
17, at 39–44. 
 31.  A Bill to Amend the Public Health Service Act to Authorize Financial Assistance for Organ 
Procurement Organizations and For Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on 
Health & Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 10 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on 
H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & Env’t]. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 10. 
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But then, in the fall of 1983, came a Washington Post story about H. Barry 
Jacobs, whose medical license had been revoked five years earlier on a 
conviction for Medicare fraud. The story discussed Jacobs’ plans to establish an 
organ brokerage called the International Kidney Exchange (IKE). Jacobs 
would recruit healthy individuals from poor countries and fly them to the 
United States where he would pay them for one of their kidneys. The individual 
needing a transplant would pay for the cost of the kidney plus $2000 to $5000 
for Jacobs’ service to “escape the tyranny of dialysis,” as the New York Times 
put it.34 
In November 1983, Representative Al Gore’s Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and 
Technology invited Jacobs to testify at a hearing entitled Procurement and 
Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation. His testimony was not well-
received. Jacobs’ pugnacious manner and his frank acknowledgement of the 
money-making potential of IKE could not have helped his cause. Jacobs’ 
“business plan” became the lightning rod for a general outcry against the idea 
of paying for organs.35 Section 301, a provision prohibiting payment for organs, 
was soon inserted into the draft bill.36 
Over the course of numerous NOTA hearings and congressional reports, a 
set of concerns driving the prohibition emerged, all of them relating to 
commercial payments by the recipient to the donor that might or might not be 
mediated by a broker—but none of them by their terms extending to 
noncommercial (though perhaps still enrichment-bearing) transactions. The 
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated in its report that the 
proposed legislation “[p]rohibits the interstate buying and selling of human 
organs for transplantation,”37 and that “the prohibition on the buying and 
selling of human organs is directed at preventing the for-profit marketing of 
kidneys and other organs,”38 and, finally, that “[i]t is the sense of the Committee 
that individuals or organizations should not profit by the sale of human organs 
for transplantation.”39 The House conference report reiterated that section 301 
was directed toward monetary exchanges: “This title intends to make the 
buying and selling of human organs unlawful . . . .”40 The key terms, “buying,” 
“selling,” “marketing,” and “profit,” are all terms relating to commercial 
business transactions. 
 
 34.  Nicholas Wade, The Editorial Notebook; The Crisis in Human Spare Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
1983, at A26; see also Susan Hankin Denise, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015 
(1985). 
 35.  Keith Mueller, The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984: Congressional Response to 
Changing Biotechnology, 8 POL’Y STUD. REV. 346, 350 (1989); Victor Cohn, New Federal Help for 
Transplants Pressed by Gore, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1983, at A17 (describing how Gore was moved to 
ban commerce of organs as a “response” to Barry Jacobs’ Virginia plan for IKE). 
 36.  Cohn, supra note 35. 
 37.  S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976 (emphasis added). 
 38.  Id. at 2, 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976, 3978 (emphasis added). 
 39.  Id. at 16–17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3982 (emphasis added). 
 40.  H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992. 
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Members and witnesses also expressed concern that a payment regime 
would exacerbate economic inequalities because only wealthy patients would be 
able to afford organs and, to make matters worse, they (and perhaps greedy 
brokers as well) would be benefitting at the expense of the poor, who would 
serve as donors.41 These concerns, again, most clearly applied to commercial 
transactions for organs. Representative Henry Waxman of the House Ways and 
Means Committee invoked the image of a degrading, heartless marketplace, 
saying, “Human organs should not be treated like fenders in a junkyard.”42 The 
late Senator Paul Tsongas introduced a Senate resolution entitled A Resolution 
to Condemn the Sale for Profit of Human Organs for Transplantation.43 His 
accompanying statement pressed the need for NOTA section 301 as a corrective 
to monetary exchange that was already taking place sporadically: 
Representative Tsongas worried that “the . . . pressures caused by a lack of 
national policy have encouraged the practices of the sale of human organs for 
profit.”44 Some commentators said that introducing payment into the organ 
procurement apparatus could undermine the newly formed altruistic system 
before its full potential was realized.45 
The legislative history therefore demonstrates that the insertion of section 
301(a), the ban against the transfer of human organs for valuable consideration, 
was a direct response to a specific plan for the buying and selling of organs. The 
purpose was to repudiate the kind of commercial transaction reflected in the 
Jacobs scenario. It was not to broadly prohibit all transactional organ 
exchanges. 
B. The Policy Rationale of a NOTA Section 301 Can Be Satisfied Without 
Banning Noncommercial State-Benefit Programs 
When passed, NOTA section 301 was intended to assuage critics who 
worried that an organ market would (1) necessarily involve class disparity in the 
distribution of transplants, (2) stifle a system of altruism before it could take 
root, (3) encourage commodification of donors and profiteering by 
unscrupulous middlemen, (4) promote crowding out of nonmonetary reasons to 
 
 41.  Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 19, 1983, at A9; see Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearing 
on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 98th 
Cong. 377 (1983) [hereinafter Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation] 
(statement by physician about inadequate follow-up healthcare); see also National Organ Transplant 
Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 98th Cong. 257 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & 
the Env’t] (stating that only the wealthy would be able to afford transplants); id. at 282 (worrying that 
the wealthy will benefit at the expense of the poor).  
 42.  National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the 
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 26 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the 
Subcomm. on Health]. 
 43.  S. RES. 251, 98th Cong. (1983).   
 44.   Id.  
 45.  Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcom. on Health & Env’t, supra note 31, at 234, 277. 
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donate, (5) encourage donors to lie about their medical histories, and (6) cause 
the costs of transplantation to become unnecessarily high. All of these concerns 
can be fully addressed without interpreting NOTA section 301 to prohibit state 
incentive programs. 
First, critics of Jacobs’ plan cited the risk of inflaming economic-class 
disparity.46 In a traditional free market, the wealthy can obtain items and the 
poor cannot. But in virtually all state proposals for donor compensation, it is 
not the sick person who reaches into his own pocket to reward the donor. A 
governmental entity provides the reward. Thus, no matter how generous or 
modest a patient’s income, anyone in need of a kidney would benefit. And, in 
keeping with the current system for distribution of organs from the newly 
deceased, the newly offered kidney would go to the next patient in line. As for 
the financial status of donors, as opposed to recipients, some express worry that 
the promise of a reward will exploit poor donors who saw it as an offer they 
couldn’t refuse. The obvious remedy is to establish a months-long screening 
process, to allay impulsivity, and to reward donors in the form of a noncash 
reward which will not appeal to those in desperate need of immediate financial 
help. An additional option is to limit participation to would-be donors whose 
incomes are high enough so that they pay taxes (and hence are eligible for a 
nonrefundable tax credit) or to those who make a certain threshold income. 
The drawback to such an approach, however, is that it would prevent some very 
low-income individuals from participating in a program that they might deem 
beneficial. But in any event, distributive concerns can be addressed within the 
framework of state-benefit programs—such concerns do not require banning 
state programs altogether. 
A second objection to enriching donors that was expressed at the time was 
that a national system of organ procurement and allocation was not yet up and 
running. But what would happen if the “altruistic” system were inadequate? 
Notably, Al Gore offered a back-up plan. He spoke of using “a voucher system 
or a tax credit to a donor’s estate” if “efforts to improve voluntary donation are 
unsuccessful.”47Almost three decades after the passage of NOTA, it is clear that 
voluntary donation has not succeeded in meeting the needs of thousands of 
patients. Thus, whatever concern might be voiced over the integrity of the 
altruistic system has been mooted by the inefficacy of that system. 
Third, what of respect for donors? Of treating their organs as “like fenders 
in a junk yard,” as Representative Waxman feared? Herding poor people on a 
plane to travel to a foreign land to undergo a surgical procedure they might not 
even understand and shipping them back home without follow-up care is not a 
winning plan. 
But again, that scenario is nothing like the one that has been proposed. 
 
 46.  Walter Sullivan, Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked,  N.Y. TIMES,  September 24, 1983 at 9; 
Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcom. on Health & Env’t, supra note 31, at 329.  
 
 47.  Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcom. on Health & Env’t, supra note 31, at 10. 
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Dignity is affirmed when we respect the capacity of individuals to make 
decisions in their own best interest, protect their health, and express gratitude 
for their sacrifice. Enrichment is not per se inconsistent with this. It is hard to 
imagine what kind of sacred principle is threatened by rewarding a donor who is 
willing, protected, and informed, and whose actions avert needless suffering or 
save a life. 
A fourth concern was that providing financial incentives would decrease the 
willingness of people to voluntarily donate their organs.48 Such a conclusion was 
premised on the writing of British social scientist Richard Titmuss.49 However, a 
careful reading of Titmuss does not support this point, and subsequent 
experiments with incentives for blood donation indicate that any crowding out 
is not universal and that, among groups where it might be an issue, the problem 
can be averted by turning the reward into a contribution to a charity.50 So the 
concern that altruism might run dry is, again, no bar to state-benefit programs. 
Fifth, some witnesses to Jacobs’ proposed plan worried that financial 
incentives would create a powerful inducement for potential donors to provide 
inaccurate medical histories.51 That concern is largely moot given the modern-
day ability to test for HIV, hepatitis C, and other transmissible diseases. Nor is 
the time pressure in living-organ donation as pressing as for deceased, where 
there is not sufficient time to interview the donor’s family, obtain old medical 
records, and so on. State-benefit programs can operate without implicating 
whatever remnant of this concern still exists. 
Another fear was that donors with valuable matches would extort large 
sums of money from vulnerable patients.52 Again, there is no opportunity for 
this to occur because a government, not patients themselves, offers the benefits. 
Any benefits would be fixed and the kidney would go to the next in line, so a 
donor could not extort money from any particular individual who needed the 
kidney of a particular biological type. This fear, too, then, does not necessitate a 
ban of state-benefit programs. 
Finally, there was the caveat that financial incentives would add cost to the 
overall transplantation budget.53 This is certainly wrong in the case of kidney 
transplants (and likely erroneous with respect to other organs as well). Multiple 
economic analyses of kidney transplantation demonstrate impressive savings 
 
 48.  See Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health, supra note 42, at 112, 115, 174–75; 
Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation, supra note 31, at 230, 239–40, 243, 
248–49, 269–71, 340–41, 354–56, 369–71. 
 49.  RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 
(1970).  
 50.  See Lorenz Goette, Alois Stutzer & Beat M. Frey, Prosocial Motivation and Blood Donations: 
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 37 TRANSFUSION MED. & HEMOTHERAPHY 149 (2010), available 
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2914427/pdf/tmh0037-0149.pdf. 
 51.  See Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 860 n.30 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Edward W. Nelson et al., Financial Incentives for Organ Donations: A Rep. to the Payment 
Subcomm. OPTN/UNOS Ethics Comm. (June 30, 1993), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ 
bioethics.asp?index=4 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
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based on the removal of patients from chronic dialysis, a treatment that is 
typically paid for by Medicare and Medicaid, not private insurance.54 In fact, 
once a patient is off dialysis, the money saved by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) could be used to underwrite the cost of the reward. 
This concern, like all of the others, by no means requires a ban of state 
programs—in fact, this one counsels in favor of state programs. 
In sum, all potential risks enumerated above as the rationale for banning 
incentives can be mitigated by reform models that stipulate a government-
regulated, in-kind system of exchange. State-benefit programs can operate 
without offending the concerns above. 
In its opinion regarding medical marijuana, the DOJ considered whether 
state law stood “‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”55 We can ask the same thing of a state-
initiated effort to pass incentive legislation. Put another way, did Congress truly 
intend for a widow to be fined $50,000 or imprisoned for five years because she 
accepted a funeral benefit in return for permitting doctors to transplant the 
organs of her deceased husband? Did lawmakers believe that felony charges 
should be brought against a state-based charity that enables a graduate student 
fund his retirement account subsequent to donating the kidney that saves the 
life of a young father who was failing on dialysis? In light of its emphases on 
buying, selling, power imbalances between the wealthy and the poor, and 
profiting by intermediaries, it is hard to imagine that Congress had the widow, 
or even the graduate student, in its sights. 
C. Additional Rules of Statutory Interpretation and Construction 
Beyond the language, legislative intent, and background purposes of the 
ban, two other canons of statutory construction affirm the conclusion that 
NOTA section 301(a) ought to be read narrowly and, as such, apply only to 
clearly commercial exchanges, not to state incentive programs. First, the rule of 
lenity requires statutes with penal provisions (like NOTA section 301) be 
interpreted narrowly so that criminal sanctions are only imposed in the most 
unambiguous of circumstances. Second, the presumption against preemption 
holds that when a federal statute can be read not to preempt state laws, a 
respect for federalist principles necessitates reading the federal rule narrowly. 
1. Criminal Penalties and the Rule of Lenity 
In accurately interpreting the scope of NOTA’s prohibition, it is significant 
to note that the prohibition is enforced by a high—and criminal—penalty for 
 
 54.  See  Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (vendor) kidneys: A Cost-
effectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216-21 (2004). 
 55.  TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 8 
(2012), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R42398_20120306.pdf (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)). 
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violation: namely, a possible $50,000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both.56 
The rule of lenity holds that a court interpreting a penal provision in the law 
should resolve any statutory uncertainty in favor of the defendant by adopting a 
narrower—meaning more lenient—reading of the scope of the crime.57 This idea 
flows from the concern that expansive judicial interpretations of penal 
provisions would create criminal penalties not originally intended by the 
legislature.58 Following the rule of lenity ensures “fair warning [to citizens] by so 
resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply to conduct clearly 
covered.”59 Because criminal punishment is to be avoided where not clearly 
imposed, more lenient interpretations are to be favored over other, similarly 
plausible but harsher, interpretations.60 Because NOTA’s prohibition against the 
transfer of human organs for valuable consideration is enforced by criminal 
penalties, it should be interpreted narrowly by limiting the scope of prohibited 
activity to clearly and definitively commercial endeavors. 
2. Presumption Against Preemption 
Under our federalist system, valid federal law supersedes inconsistent state 
law.61 There is, however, a presumption against preemption.62 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has said, “[H]istoric police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by [a federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”63 Whenever there are multiple plausible interpretations of a statute, 
courts are to choose the interpretation that grants the most leeway to the states, 
particularly when the law concerns core state-level functions, including public 
health and the design of the state’s tax and expenditure system. 64 
The reluctance to preempt state authority is at its apogee when a federal law 
would disrupt implementation of the state government’s own programs (as 
opposed to merely displacing the state’s authority to regulate private conduct). 
Therefore, even if “valuable consideration” is generally interpreted to apply to 
private payments, it should not so easily apply to state-government benefits 
provided to organ donors. 
There is a precedent for this in the antitrust exemption. The Sherman Act 
states, “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
 
 56.  42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 57.  See generally NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 59.3, at 126–31. 
 58.  Id. at 133. 
 59.  United States v. Pritchard, 346 F.3d 469, 474 (2003) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 
259, 266 (1997). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, supra 
note 17, at 18–19. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (presumption against preemption for 
police powers), quoted in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT 
TRENDS, supra note 17, at 18. 
 64.  Id.  
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conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”65 State legislative programs to restrain 
competition could easily be interpreted to fall within this prohibition. Yet the 
Supreme Court held in Parker v. Brown in 1943 that the Sherman Act does not 
bar such programs.66 The Court paid no heed to the absence of a specific 
exemption for state programs. Instead, it emphasized the absence of a specific 
inclusion of state programs and also relied on the premise that a state program 
is not a “contract,” “combination,” or “conspiracy.” The Court said: 
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests 
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed 
by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the 
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their 
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and 
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress. The Sherman Act makes no mention 
of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or 
official action directed by a state . . . There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain 
state action in the Act’s legislative history . . . The state in adopting and enforcing the 
[challenged] program made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy 
in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint 
as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.67 
The Court subsequently held that anticompetitive conduct by private parties 
is immune from the Sherman Act if the parties are implementing a policy 
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” and “actively supervised” by 
the state government.68 
Because NOTA section 301 does not mention the proscription of benefits to 
organ donors made or authorized by state governments, extending by 
interpretation the application of NOTA’s restriction to such state benefits 
would too lightly attribute to Congress “an unexpressed purpose to nullify a 
state’s control over its officers and agents,” exactly what the Court refused to do 
in Parker.69 
Indeed, the intrusion on state sovereignty would be even greater in the 
NOTA context than in the Sherman Act context, at least for organ-donation 
benefits provided directly by the state. In that case, the issue at stake would not 
be the state’s power to regulate private businesses, which constantly operates 
under the possibility of federal preemption, but the state’s fundamental power 
to structure its own tax and spending programs—its ability to decide how fiscal 
burdens and benefits should be distributed among its citizens.70 Also, 
 
 65.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 66.  Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 350–52 (1943). 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); see 
also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99–100 (1988) (supporting the clearly articulated and actively 
supervised standard); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56–57 
(1985) (supporting the same standard). 
 69.  Parker, 351 U.S. at 351. 
 70.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the vital importance of states’ taxing power. 
See, e.g., Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 (1953) (describing “the power of a state to tax” as “basic to 
its sovereignty”); Tulley et al. v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 73 (1976) (recognizing “the imperative need 
8_SATEL_MORRISON_JONES_EIC  (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2015  12:48 PM 
No. 3 2014] STATE ORGAN-DONATION INCENTIVES 233 
interpreting the term “valuable consideration” to include state tax incentives or 
grants is at least as problematic as interpreting “contract,” “conspiracy,” or 
“combination” to include state programs to restrain competition. 
The case for a NOTA exception for state benefits or tax incentives for organ 
donors is therefore at least as strong as the case for the Parker exception to the 
Sherman Act. The state is not buying organs. Rather, “as sovereign” and 
through “an act of government,” the state is bestowing its bounty on citizens 
who have engaged in behavior of which the state approves. Parker teaches, 
therefore, that NOTA’s ban should be interpreted so as to grant the most 
leeway to the states and should not apply to benefit programs for organ 
donation made by or through the state. Moreover, such an interpretation is 
supported by the principles motivating a federalist system (which is discussed in 
the next section). 
Finally, the DOJ’s OLC contemplated the scope of section 301 of NOTA in 
a 2007 memorandum.71 Within this memorandum, the meaning of “commercial” 
is inconsistent with banning in-kind compensation. The DOJ notes that “[t]he 
legislative history [of NOTA section 301] does not suggest that any Member of 
Congress understood the bill as addressing non-monetary or otherwise non-
commercial transfers.”72 Even when transfers, such as swaps (exchanges of 
kidneys between donors and recipients of two unmatched pairs), go beyond 
gratuitous offers and enter into quid pro quo territory, the spirit of section 301 
has been deemed by the DOJ to remain intact. Like kidney swaps, 
contemporary incentive plans do not entail cash or purchasing in the traditional 
sense. There is no overt or implied contract between the patient and the donor: 
Participants can withdraw without penalty. 
Nor is there a role for a broker, like Jacobs, to reap profits.73 Furthermore, 
 
of a State to administer its own fiscal operations”). Accordingly, the Court has required that Congress 
speak clearly when it wishes to restrict states’ taxing authority. See, e.g., Department of Revenue of 
Oregon v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (stating that “principles of federalism” make the 
Court reluctant to extend “beyond its evident scope” a federal statute that “sets limits upon the 
taxation authority of state government, an authority we have recognized as central to state 
sovereignty”). Because no restrictions on state tax incentives fall with the “evident scope” of NOTA, 
ACF counsels that the statute not be interpreted as imposing any such restriction.  
   
      71.    See infra, part II.E. 
 72.  Memorandum from C. Kevin Marshall, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Daniel Meron, 
Gen. Counsel, Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Legality of Alternative Organ Donation Practices Under 
42 U.S.C. § 274e, at 4 n.2 (Mar. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Marshall Memorandum], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/organtransplant.pdf. 
 73.  On a related note, in the context of medical marijuana, a DOJ memorandum clarified the 
distinction between sick individuals who required marijuana for health reasons and “commercial,” for-
profit dispensaries (which are analogous to brokers like Jacobs). Memorandum from James M. Cole, 
Deputy Attorney G. to U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking 
to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/ 
dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf. Prosecutorial discretion extended to the patients 
who purchased medical marijuana; it was the distributers who were targeted for prosecution. Id. In the 
case of incentivized organ donation, absolutely everyone who requires an organ is very sick, if not 
terminally ill, and no individual profits from organizing the transfer of an organ to the patient. 
8_SATEL_MORRISON_JONES_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2015  12:48 PM 
234 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:217  
the donor reward can be framed as compensation for time and inconvenience, 
not for the organ per se. This is in keeping with the practice surrounding 
surrogacy: It is not the baby itself that carries monetary value, but the birth 
mother’s sacrifice of time and inconvenience. Moreover, compensation to organ 
donors could take the form of noncash, in-kind benefits. 
D. The Case for Federalism in Organ Transplantation 
Federalist principles do more than simply support a canon of statutory 
construction; they also undergird a basic normative preference in our dualist 
system. Going beyond the canons of construction, federalism-based arguments 
can be employed to explain why, as a more basic policy matter, NOTA section 
301 should be read as banning only commercial exchanges of organs, rather 
than government-regulated in-kind systems of exchange. 
The general merits of federalism have of course been argued at length in the 
related scholarship and jurisprudence,74 and there is no need to go any further in 
defending federalist principles for the purposes of this article. Even without 
doing so, the benefits of a federalist approach are clear in the organ transplant–
policy case for two reasons: First, because organ transplantation presents 
unique features that make the normative experimentation, core-competency, 
local-control, and state-diversity arguments for federalism more powerful. 
Second, because federalism has been the dominant approach in the field of 
organ-transplant policy for some time now. The current state of affairs proves 
that, accepting even just the federalist basics, NOTA section 301 should be read 
as banning only commercial exchanges of organs. 
A signal advantage of federalism is its ability to use varying state legal 
regimes as laboratories to test change.75 Enacting reforms on the state level 
creates natural experiments, with reformist states testing an intervention and 
complacent states taking the position of the control groups. This dynamic 
gauges both the positive and negative elements of reform. In the transplant 
case, where positive results (numbers of donors and transplants) are necessarily 
easy to count, reform efforts can be tested fairly quickly. 
Experimentation also links up well to the commodification concerns raised 
by compensation-based reforms. The commodification label applies to a set of 
 
 74.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to 
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term—
Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60–69 (1998) (advocating using 
federalism as a model for decentralized decisionmaking for judges to use to allow provisional, workable 
solutions to disputes); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the 
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 19–22 (2007) (arguing that constructive political 
debate is created by strong states’ rights as it leads to effective and organized interest groups);Michael 
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493–94 (1987); 
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005) 
(“[D]ual sovereignty” defines federalism as “a system of independent national and state governments 
that must be protected from each other.”). 
 75.  See Hills, supra note 74.  
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arguments that are rather diverse,76 but some potential consequences are 
testable hypothesis.77 For example, compensating a kidney donor could cause a 
donor (and society in general) to devalue the integrity of her body, or bodies in 
general; it might lead the donor to envision herself as merely a source of 
monetary value rather than as a valued human being. Will donors who receive 
some form of compensation experience themselves as devalued? Will states that 
allow some forms of compensation for transplants find themselves sliding down 
a slippery slope towards legalizing other potentially corrupting legal practices? 
Though unlikely, these kinds of corruptions might possibly follow from 
compensation-based reforms, and society needs to know if any of them do. 
Even then, states will still have to weigh the frequency with which they occur 
against happier outcomes and ways to protect against them in the future. On the 
other hand, many advocates for donor compensation believe the potential for 
corruption to be illusory; the only thing capable of informing this debate would 
be future experimentation with different policies.78 
There is also a question of the relative competence of federal and state 
actors in deciding transplant policy. Effective interest-group organizing may be 
more active at the local level. Different states with different demographic 
profiles79 may find the prospect of effectuating change more or less difficult. 
Additionally, the regional organization of deceased-donation policy means that 
different states will vary in terms of the demand for change. States that are 
lagging in transplant outcomes may have a stronger demand for reform. Local 
interest groups in those states might become more active than those in more 
successful states. Alternately, policy innovators in relatively successful states 
might have more influence and expertise, allowing them to be more effective in 
enacting policy. On a federal level, moreover, interest-group politics may be 
less effective. Given the lack of progress in recent years, it may be the case that 
current stakeholders have grown complacent and are incentivized to simply 
perpetuate their own fiefdoms. If reform is itself desirable, the states may be the 
only game in town. Piloting reform at the state level can help foster a national 
discussion. 
 
 76.  Julie Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 121–24 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
 77.  See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN 
SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS AND OTHER THINGS (1996); M. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY 9 
(2012); Elizabeth Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71 (1990). 
 78.  See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, 
and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007).  
 79.  Hypertension and diabetes (as well as other causes of kidney disease) are more prevalent 
among poorer populations. Minorities are typically overrepresented on the waiting list for organs, 
partly because of increased risk factors and partly because the increased difficulty of biological 
matching from a smaller population. See Jasjit S. Ahluwalia et al., Correlates of Controlled 
Hypertension in Indigent, Inner-City Hypertensive Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 77, 77 (2002); 
see also U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Research on Social and Behavioral Interventions to 
Increase Organ Donation Grant Program 1999-2004,  
http://organdonor.gov/dtcp/minoritycampaign.html (last visited June 15, 2014). 
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Finally, health policy has traditionally been conducted at the local level. 
Transplant policy in particular has largely been organized regionally. State 
governments maintain waiting lists, legal rules concerning deceased donation 
and consent are contained in state statute, and transplants are facilitated by 
regional entities called organ-procurement organizations (OPOs). Indeed, 
looking to the history of transplant policy demonstrates how it has traditionally 
been a state-level concern, making conservative interpretations of federal rules 
particularly appropriate. 
Ultimately, then, there are powerful normative reasons for bringing a 
federalism-based approach to the forefront of transplant policy. These 
arguments alone would counsel a narrow construction of NOTA section 301 as 
banning only commercial exchanges, but, helpfully, further arguments, based on 
states’ historical control over organ-transplantation policy, are available. 
Organ-transplantation policy has not always been a matter of federal 
oversight. Prior to the enactment of NOTA, the federal government essentially 
left this issue to the states. Indeed, the first policy effort to address organ 
scarcity in the United States was initiated at the state level with the enactment 
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968.80 
The UAGA was a model law developed by the National Conference of 
Commissioners for Uniform State Laws and adopted in nearly identical form by 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia by the early 1970s.81 The Conference 
convened a group of highly esteemed individuals, recruited and appointed by 
various state governors, to draft an organ-transplant policy. E. Blythe Stason, 
professor of law and former dean and provost of the University of Michigan, 
chaired the commission.82 
The UAGA focused primarily on who possessed the jurisdiction over 
organs of the deceased for the purposes of donation, and under what 
circumstances organ donation could be made.83 But that is not all the act did. 
The commissioners, led by Stason, also made strides toward considering 
incentives as a means of organ procurement: They left the question open for 
individual state legislatures to resolve through the democratic process.84 
Although commentators differ on whether the omission from the UAGA of 
direct language on this point was intentional or an oversight, there are 
indications that leaving the question of incentives for states to decide was 
 
 80.  N.J. LAW REVISION COMM., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE UNIFORM 
ANATOMICAL GIFTS ACT (1987) at 2, available at http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/rpts/anagft.pdf  
[hereinafter Report and Recommendation]. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Memorial Resolution by the University of Michigan Law Faculty Concerning E. Blythe Stason, 
71 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1973) [hereinafter Memorial Resolution]. Stason also served as the Frank C. 
Rand Distinguished Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University during the drafting of the UAGA.  
 83.  Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act, § 23-06.6-01 (1978), available at 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/t23c06-6.pdf?20140420153611. 
 84.  E. Blythe Stason, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 BUS. LAW. 919–27 (1968); Michele 
Goodwin The Body Market: Race Politics & Private Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (2007). 
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reasoned and deliberate. As a dean, provost, and commissioner, Stason was 
known for being meticulous, methodical, and purposeful in the examination of 
ideas and the implementation of policies.85 With Stason at the helm of the 
commission, if the framers intended to ban the sale of organs, they would have 
done so.86 
In any case, Stason made his views clear. He said that the UAGA drafters 
contemplated incentives and supported allowing states the flexibility to decide 
those matters. In interviews and writings after the enactment of the UAGA, the 
commission chair remarked that the question of payments was intentionally left 
open for states to decide.87 Demonstrating a nuanced view of what organ 
transplantation in the United States could become, Stason acknowledged that 
the possibility of donors demanding payments might arise, but he did not hold 
that all payments would be unethical, immoral, or illegal.88 According to Stason, 
the commissioners felt that “the matter [of payments] should be left to the 
decency of intelligent human beings.”89 In taking this position, Stason adhered 
to Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous admonition that federalism allows for the 
possibility that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country . . . .”90 
After presenting the UAGA model law to their home states for ratification 
and enactment, legislators sought to work within the spirit of the original draft. 
In a radical shift, states that had previously enacted laws to ban payments for 
organs and body parts—among them Massachusetts, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Maryland, and New York—repealed them.91 For the next sixteen years, the 1968 
UAGA, as adopted by the states, was the only law governing organ 
transplantation in America.92 When Congress adopted NOTA, it therefore did 
so against the backdrop of a legal regime in which organ donation incentives 
had been left to states’ autonomous decisions. 
E. The DOJ and UNOS Have Already Narrowly Construed Section 301 
As reviewed above, the text, the legislative history, and the statutory 
 
 85.  Memorial Resolution, supra note 82. 
 86.  Stason, supra note 84, at 928 (assuming that payment would be rare and that crafting a 
prohibition would “not be easy” and concluding that until payment “becomes a problem of some 
dimensions,” the matter should not be addressed through legislative prohibition). 
 87.  See, e.g., id. at 921–24. 
 88.  Id. at 927. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 91.  See Act of June 12, 1967, ch. 353, § 7, 1967 Mass. Acts 202, 202 (repealed 1971) (prohibiting the 
sale of organs, body parts, and tissues after death); see also Law of August 1, 1968, ch. 429, § 1780, 56 
Del. Laws 1773, 1773 (1967) (repealed 1970); Act of May 20, 1967, ch. 94, § 1, 1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 91, 
91 (repealed 1969) (prohibiting the sale of bodies after death); Law of April 24, 1961, ch. 315, § 1, 1961 
Md. Laws 397, 398 (repealed 1968); Law of April 22, 1964, ch. 702, § 1, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1827, 1828 
(repealed 1971). 
 92.  Report and Recommendation, supra note 80. 
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purposes of NOTA section 301(a) lead to the conclusion that state benefits 
should lie outside the scope of section 301’s ban. The DOJ’s OLC reviewed the 
scope of section 301 using similar analysis in a 2007 memorandum and 
interpreted it to have a narrow application to transactions clearly and definitely 
commercial.93 Inasmuch as NOTA’s criminal penalties would be prosecuted by 
the DOJ, their analysis of section 301(a) is persuasive evidence of the best 
reading of NOTA section 301.94 
The DOJ memorandum concerned paired exchanges, which help patients 
who already have a willing donor but cannot receive the kidney because of 
biological incompatibility. If this mismatched couple can trade with another 
mismatched couple, the transplants can take place, with the donor from couple 
A giving his kidney to the compatible recipient of couple B, and vice versa. The 
virtue is that two lives are saved instead of none. Without the exchange, both 
patients would languish on dialysis. 
In determining that paired exchanges did not violate section 301, the DOJ 
acknowledged the murkiness surrounding the statutory language “valuable 
consideration.” Noting that valuable consideration is defined in the statute by 
what it is not (reimbursement for expenses related to donation), the DOJ 
memorandum said “the vague phrase ‘valuable consideration’ addresses organ 
transfers that could be considered to involve a ‘purchase’ rather than all 
donations that may involve some exchange.”95 According to the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), which was also called upon to review NOTA in this 
context, “[t]he legislative history of the 1984 NOTA does not discuss the 
meaning of the term ‘valuable consideration’. It simply expresses Congress’s 
intent to criminalize the buying and selling of organs for profit.”96 The DOJ 
went even further than the CRS and stated that because section 301 is a 
criminal statute, it must be interpreted narrowly under the rule of lenity.97 As 
such, “valuable consideration” is best understood “as referring to the buying 
and selling of organs for monetary gain or to organ exchanges that are 
otherwise commercial.”98 
 
 93.  Marshall Memorandum, supra note 72.  
 94.  The DOJ prosecutes federal law offenders and represents the U.S. government in court; its 
attorneys represent the rights and interests of the American people and enforce federal criminal and 
civil laws. See About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 
10, 2014).  
 95.  Marshall Memorandum, supra note 72, at 2–3.  
 96.  ERIN D. WILLIAMS, BERNICE REYES-AKINBILEJE & KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33902, LIVING ORGAN DONATION AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 9 (2007), 
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33902_20070308.pdf. 
 97.  Marshall Memorandum, supra note 72, at 6.  
 98.  Id. at 5, 6–7 (emphasis added). One commentator on the DOJ’s legal analysis has stated, 
DOJ’s analysis focused heavily on the involvement of monetary value in the transfer of human organs 
and how the presence or absence of monetary value impacts the conclusion that a transaction contains 
“valuable consideration.” This focus apparently enabled the DOJ to address the issue at hand as to 
whether something not of monetary value—the kidney exchange programs—could be “valuable 
consideration.” At this point, the devil is in the detail. The DOJ concluded that for consideration to be 
valuable it must involve something of “pecuniary, readily convertible into monetary value.” It did not, 
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Ultimately, the DOJ determined that “the legislative history does not 
suggest that any Member of Congress understood the bill as addressing non-
monetary or otherwise non-commercial transfers.”99 Therefore, a transfer of an 
organ through paired exchange does not involve “valuable consideration.”100 
Similarly, General Counsel to UNOS also undertook a legal analysis of 
paired donations in the context of section 301.101 According to the network’s 
2006 position paper, “NOTA § 301 is legally and historically inapplicable to 
today’s living donation arrangements.”102 Paired exchange preserves the 
essential elements of a gift which are, firstly, “donative intent,” meaning an 
intention to give without accrual of material personal benefit—the living donor 
gives up something, for example a kidney, and knowingly assumes additional 
health risk, secondly, actual presentation of the kidney, and, finally, its 
acceptance without payment.103 Noting that Congress’s intent in enacting NOTA 
was to criminalize the purchase and sale of organs for profit, as in commercial 
business transactions, by defining valuable consideration “as monetary transfer 
or a transfer of valuable property between donor, recipient, and/or organ 
broker in a sale transaction,”104 counsel to UNOS also concluded that paired 
kidney donations involved conditional gifts and were, therefore, not restricted 
by section 301. 
Congress ultimately adopted the Norwood Act on December 21, 2007,105 
which amended NOTA to expressly exempt paired donations from “valuable 
consideration.”106 Accordingly, the specific question examined by the DOJ and 
 
however, conclude the converse: that all things of “pecuniary, readily convertible into monetary value” 
are “valuable consideration.” The DOJ ultimately said that “valuable consideration” in section 301(a) 
of NOTA refers to the “buying and selling of organs for monetary gain or to organ exchanges that are 
otherwise commercial.” The fundamental distinction drawn, therefore, was not between the monetary 
or nonmonetary value of the thing transacted but between the commercial as opposed to 
noncommercial nature of the transactions. 
Jones, supra note 22, at 1086–87. 
 99.  Marshall Memorandum, supra note 72, at 3 n.2.  
 100.  Rick Jones, in The Gift of Life and “Diseases of Language,” further commented that, 
“inasmuch as the kidney exchange programs reviewed by the Department of Justice did not have any 
clear pecuniary transfer, they were deemed not to involve valuable consideration because without 
obvious monetary value in the exchange there was no valuableness in the transfer. Without valuableness 
there could be no valuable consideration.” Supra note 22, at 1088 (emphasis in original).  
 101.  WILLIAMS MULLEN, INTENDED RECIPIENT EXCHANGES, PAIRED EXCHANGES AND NOTA 
§ 301, at 1 (2003). 
 102.  Id. at 2.  
 103.  Numerous court cases have found that gifts cannot contain consideration. See Deli v. 
Hasselmo, 542 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (“[C]onsideration is what distinguishes a 
contract from a gift.”); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 4 N.E.2d 919, 919 (Ohio 1936) (noting that there is 
no consideration in a gratuitous transfer); Rusk v. Rusk, 5 S.W.3d 299, 303–05 (Tex. App. 1999) 
(holding that absence of consideration is key to finding a legal gift); Pankhurst v. Weitinger & Tucker, 
850 S.W.2d 726, 730–31 (Tex. App. 1993) (stating that lack of consideration is an essential characteristic 
of a gift).  
 104.  MULLEN, supra note 101, at 2. 
 105.  Pub. L. No. 110-144, 121 Stat. 1813 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273b, 274e (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2011)). 
 106.  42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
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UNOS, whether paired donations violated the pre-Norwood version of section 
301, is moot. Nonetheless, the DOJ and UNOS analyses are highly instructive, 
because they both strongly support a narrow interpretation of “valuable 
consideration” as involving purely commercial endeavors. Thus, the DOJ 
analysis confirms what seems perfectly clear from the other sources considered: 
NOTA should be read narrowly, to ban only commercial exchanges of organs—
not state-benefit programs. 
III 
THE PENNSYLVANIA EXPERIENCE 
Notwithstanding the strong statutory basis for concluding that NOTA does 
not ban state-benefit programs, the law has nonetheless in fact impeded states 
from adopting such programs. To that end, we now consider the struggle that 
accompanied Pennsylvania’s funeral-benefit law, the only state law to test the 
scope of NOTA’s ban on valuable consideration. That Pennsylvania is the only 
state to have even tested NOTA’s scope itself suggests that the law may be 
having a chilling effect. 
In 1994, the Pennsylvania legislature unanimously passed the Burial Benefit 
Act,107 which provided modest reimbursement of hospital or burial expenses of 
deceased donors—expenses that would have been incurred whether or not the 
organs of the deceased were retrieved. Signed into law by then-Governor 
Robert P. Casey, Sr., who underwent a heart–liver transplant in 1993, state 
authorities said that the act was intended as a “thank you” to the donating 
family.108 In fact, the law was inspired by the details of Casey’s circumstance: His 
very own donor’s parents needed financial help to cover the burial of their son. 
The primary sponsor of Act 102 said that the burial provision was intended to 
spare other donor families the same financial stress.109 
The idea of a funeral benefit garnered support. At that time, The American 
Medical Association (AMA) engaged the matter through its Council on Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs, which concluded in a 1995 statement that forms of financial 
incentives that stop short of outright cash payment “may be ethically 
permissible” and suggested that a pilot study be conducted.110 In 2008, they 
reasserted the legitimacy of studying incentives for deceased donation when the 
AMA House of Delegates voted to put the prospect of paying posthumous 
 
 107.  20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8 (1994).  
 108.  See C.L. Bryce et al., Do Incentives Matter? Providing Benefits to Families of Organ Donors, 5 
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2999 (2005). 
 109.  See LEGIS. BUDGET & FIN. COMM., A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S 
ORGAN AND TISSUE DONOR AWARENESS PROGRAM CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO HR-698 OF 2006, 
at S-8 (2007), available at http://lbfc.legis.state.pa.us/reports/2007/291.PDF [hereinafter LB&FC 
REPORT].  
 110.  Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Financial Incentives for Organ 
Procurement: Ethical Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric Donors, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 581, 587 (1995). 
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organ donors high on its legislative agenda.111 
Pennsylvania’s act established the Organ Donation Awareness Trust Fund 
to which state residents could contribute.112 It authorized use of 10 percent of 
that fund to defray medical or funeral expenses of the deceased, with an upper 
limit of $3000 for any one family, although at the time of creation the fund was 
only large enough to offer $300 to each family of the 400 anticipated donors.113 
From 1994 to 1999, the Pennsylvania legislature invested significant financial 
and community resources in studying whether Act 102 would conflict with 
federal law.114 Despite support for pilot studies from groups like the National 
Kidney Foundation (NKF) and the AMA, the legal counsel to the State 
Department of Health believed that it would violate NOTA’s prohibition on 
the transfer of organs for “valuable consideration.”115 The Pennsylvania funeral 
benefit therefore stalled in the final stage, lacking only a signature from the 
state secretary of health.116 The state sought clarification of this question from 
the DOJ, but received none.117 Finally, the Pennsylvania Department of  Health 
decided not to test the limits of NOTA and instead directed the funds intended 
for incentives away from funeral expenses for the deceased and toward 
reimbursement for food, travel, lodging, and lost wages incurred by living 
donors—reimbursements explicitly permitted under NOTA section 301(c)(2).118 
Subsequent efforts to revive the funeral benefit failed. In March 2000, 
counsel from an OPO in Pennsylvania made an impassioned plea to the 
department of health’s chief counsel to implement the funeral-expense pilot 
 
 111.  See Kevin B. O’Reilly, AMA Meeting: Delegates Seek to Change Law on Organ Donor 
Incentives, AM. MED. NEWS (July 7, 2008), http://www.amednews.com/article/20080707/profession/ 
307079949/7/. 
 112.  See Christopher Snowbeck, Committee Approves Plan to Reward Families for Relatives’ Organ 
Donations, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 10, 1999, at B7. 
 113.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pennsylvania Set to Break Taboo on Reward for Organ Donations, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at A1. Financial constraints aside, $300 was coincidentally the amount 
deemed ethically sound by a panel of consultant bioethicists convened by the Pennsylvania physician 
general in 1999 on the order of Pennsylvania secretary of health. The amount, the bioethicists decided, 
fell below a level they believed would be an inducement to donate, yet still represented a gratuitous 
gesture. LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 116. 
 114.  LB&FC Report, supra note 109, at 111–12. Key components of Act 102 are (1) to increase the 
requirements placed on hospitals regarding the organ donation process, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8617 
(2006), (2) to increase public awareness of organ donation, id. § 8622(b)(3), (3) to establish a fifteen-
member Organ Donation Advisory Committee, id. § 8622(c), and (4) to create the Governor Robert P. 
Casey Memorial Organ and Tissue Donation Awareness Trust Fund, id. § 8622(a). Act 102 was 
amended in 2000 to rename the trust fund after Governor Casey who died in 2000. See Act of Dec. 20, 
2000, Pub. L. No. 2000-120 (codified as amended at 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8622(a)). 
 115.  LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 116.  
 116.  Interview with Howard Nathan, President & CEO, Gift of Life Donor Program, in 
Philadelphia, Pa. (Sept 17, 2007).  
 117.  Christopher Snowbeck, Organ Donor Funeral Aid Scrapped, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 
February 1, 2002, at B1. 
 118.  See Robert Arnold et al., Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: An Ethical 
Reappraisal, 73 TRANSPLANTATION 1361, 1366 (2002). 
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program.119 The OPO counsel argued that the NOTA prohibition is limited to 
the selling of organs for profit and that “it is inconsistent with the express 
language of [NOTA], as well as the legislative history, to broaden the 
prohibition well beyond its express words to somehow prohibit the 
reimbursement of a portion of the funeral expenses of an organ donor.”120 The 
counsel further underscored that, as a criminal statute, NOTA section 301(a) 
“should be strictly construed and strictly limited to pure commercial 
transactions in human organs.”121 “To do otherwise ‘would violate the basic 
tenets of statutory construction and criminalize conduct that [was] never 
expressly addressed.’”122 But the state department of health refused to seek 
federal guidance, insisting that a proposed pilot trial of burial benefits would 
violate NOTA.123 
On a number of occasions in 2003 and again in 2004, the Pennsylvania 
Organ Donation Advisory Committee raised the subject of the funeral-expense 
pilot.124 By March 2006, the advisory committee had developed another 
proposal for funeral benefits but the secretary of health concluded that the 
committee should instead work with OPOs to develop a proposal for a pilot 
study of reimbursement for grief-counseling expenses.125 
In 2007, the Pennsylvania General Assembly undertook an evaluation of the 
state’s Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Program, including the funeral 
benefit allowed for by Act 102.126 The report concluded that “there are 
indications that a [funeral benefit] proposal could be crafted that would not 
violate [NOTA]” and recommended as follows: 
The [Pennsylvania] Department of Health should take steps to determine the legality, 
under federal law, of a funeral expense benefit for donor families that is authorized in 
state law and that the Organ Donation Advisory Committee has twice proposed to the 
Department as a pilot project. Specifically, the Department should reassess—in light 
of the recent federal Department of Justice opinion relating to kidney exchange 
programs and its analysis of valuable consideration under NOTA Section 301—
whether implementing a pilot funeral benefit program as required by Act 102 
necessarily involves buying and selling, or an otherwise commercial transfer of organs 
that “clearly and definitely” is encompassed by NOTA’s prohibition on the transfer of 
human organs for valuable consideration.127 
As of 2010 no action had been taken by the Pennsylvania Department of Health 
 
 119.  LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 116. 
 120.  Id. at 117.  
 121.  LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 126. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See id. 
 124.  LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 117. 
 125.  Organ Donation Grief Counseling Program, PA. DEP’T HEALTH, 
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/organ_donation_awareness/18861/organ_dona
tion_grief_counseling_program/830747 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
 126.  H.R. Res. 698, 2006 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2006); see LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at S-8, S-9. 
 127.  See LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at S-31. More specifically, the report recommended that 
the department of health   examine the prospect for funeral benefits again, issue an opinion on moving 
forward, and develop a written proposal for doing so. Id. at S-31.  
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on these recommendations.128 The Pennsylvania experience with state-benefit 
programs confirms that clarification of NOTA section 301 would be beneficial, 
regardless of whether or not NOTA section 301 is currently being properly 
interpreted. States need more clarity so they can better address the organ 
shortage. 
IV 
THE LIMITATIONS OF CONCRETE APPLICATION 
As stated above, reasonable state incentives provided to increase organ 
donation, if not clearly and definitely commercial, should be allowable under 
the language and intent of NOTA section 301(a). Pragmatically speaking, 
however, there are realistic restraints on the boldness of the inducements that 
can be offered. For example, are incentives of $100, $1000, and $1 million in 
value equally acceptable? Is a direct cash payment as acceptable as a tax benefit 
or a funeral reimbursement? There are likely limits on a benefit’s amount and 
structure at which a reasonable person would believe that a donation was 
requested and accomplished in exchange for the delivery of the state benefit—
indicating that a business-type inducement occurred, akin to a clear commercial 
activity. For example, the closer a state incentive’s value is to the fair market 
value of an organ, the greater the chance that the incentive would be regarded 
as being at or near a market-type transaction and, thus, contrary to NOTA. The 
more direct a benefit would be, the more risk the transaction would be viewed 
as being openly bargained for, similar to a commercial endeavor. The less the 
incentive is crafted to underscore a noncommercial, public-policy purpose and 
intent, the greater risk it would be perceived as analogous to pursuing a 
commercial effect. The purpose of this article is to argue that state incentives 
should be allowed by NOTA at some level—not to debate the scope of their 
limits. Ultimately, the door to state incentives should be opened, but the limits 
on incentives will and should be found by way of the federalist approach 
advocated herein, through which varying state legal regimes will be used as 
laboratories to test change in this area and help measure useful and harmful 
features of that change. 
V 
STATUTORY CLARIFICATION 
Because—as the Pennsylvania experience shows—states continue to 
question whether section 301 prohibits state-benefit programs, and, as a result, 
states remain reluctant to challenge the ban, clarification needs to be achieved 
regarding NOTA section 301(a). This should occur either by obtaining an 
official opinion from the DOJ that definitively interprets the law in the context 
 
 128.  See ORGAN DONATION ADVISORY COMM., THE PENNSYLVANIA ORGAN AND TISSUE 
DONATION ACTION PLAN 2010, at 16 (2010), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/ 
document/924960/2010organtissuedonationactionplan_pdf. 
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of state incentive programs or by amending the law. A request should be made 
by the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services to the DOJ Office of Legal 
Counsel to advise on the legality of public policy–driven state incentive 
programs that promote organ donation, similar to what was done in the area of 
paired exchanges. Moreover, Congress should amend NOTA to exempt such 
state-benefit arrangements. Indeed, statutory amendment may be most 
beneficial in any event to definitively remove uncertainty on the issue and to 
speed the process of change. 
There are two basic options for statutory reform. The first entails revising 
the term “valuable consideration” to exempt incentives for organ donation that 
are provided by a state or state-related entity. A second option is for Congress 
to give HHS or the DOJ authority to grant states waivers to conduct pilot trials 
of state-sponsored incentives for living or posthumous donation. Alternatively, 
the DOJ might be persuaded to agree to allow narrowly tailored pilot trials to 
go forward in light of the current felony provision, particularly if the 
Department believed the current law was ambiguous. 
Since 1981, bills have been introduced to amend NOTA to allow tax 
deductions and tax credits for deceased donation and life-insurance policies for 
living donors.129 None has been successful. In 1981 Representative Philip T. 
Crane of Illinois introduced a bill that would have offered tax incentives for 
transplantable organs from deceased donors. House Bill 3774 proposed “a 
$25,000 deduction on the [donor’s] last taxable year plus a $25,000 exclusion 
from estate taxes,” with the same incentives going to the family of a child 
donor.130 In 1999, Representative James Greenwood of Pennsylvania introduced 
House Bill 3471 in order “to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to carry out demonstration projects to increase the supply of organs 
donated for human transplantation.”131 The bill would have allowed projects to 
establish financial incentives for organ donation, including payments for the 
purchase of life-insurance policies or annuities, payable to a donor’s designee.132 
In 2000 and 2001, Representative Christopher Smith of New Jersey introduced 
the Help Organ Procurement Expand Act, which would have provided a $2500 
tax credit to individuals who donated their organs while living, or to the 
designated beneficiaries or estates of individuals who donated their organs after 
death.133 Representative Greenwood subsequently introduced similar bills, in 
2002 and in July 2003.134 In 2000 and 2001, Representative James Hansen of 
Utah introduced the Gift of Life Tax Credit Act, which would have amended 
 
 129.  See SATEL, supra note 9, at 141–43. 
 130.  HASTINGS CTR., Tax Incentives: A Market Solution to the Kidney Shortage?, 11 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP. 3 (1981). The Crane bill was referred to the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on 
Health on February 16, 1982 and died in committee.  
 131.  H.R. 2856, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c108:H.R.2856.IH. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  H.R. 2090, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 5436, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 134.  H.R. 2856, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 5224, 107th Cong. (2002).  
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the Internal Revenue Code to allow a (refundable) $10,000 credit to individuals 
who donated their organs at death.135 
In 1993, the NKF proposed that NOTA be changed to permit payments of burial 
expenses for donors. Its spokesperson suggested that a “standardized and small” 
amount, perhaps $2000, be given through an agency within HHS to “a third party 
like a funeral director.”136 (Inexplicably, now, over two decades later, the 
foundation is opposed to any proposals for donor enrichment, even though the 
organ shortage is currently far worse than when the NKF first endorsed pilot 
trials.137) A 1993 white paper by UNOS deemed incentives for deceased 
donation “ethically justifiable only if found preferable to the other feasible 
options to increase donations.”138 (Again in 2002, UNOS reiterated its call for 
pilot studies of incentives for posthumous donation.139) As noted earlier, the 
American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
concluded in a 1995 statement that forms of financial incentives that stop short 
of outright cash payment “may be ethically permissible” and suggests that a 
pilot study be conducted.140 
In 1999, the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Health and 
Environment, of the Committee on Commerce, held a hearing entitled Putting 
Patients First: Increasing Organ Supply for Transplantation.141 Representative 
James Greenwood of Pennsylvania proposed a federally funded, $10,000 life-
insurance policy for everyone in the United States, with benefits payable upon 
donation and transplantation of the deceased’s organs. Witnesses at the hearing 
were fairly unanimous in their approval of these proposed deceased-donor 
incentive programs, particularly if they might serve as pilot studies for broader 
 
 135.  The credit would presumably go to the deceased individual’s beneficiaries or estate. When the 
bill was proposed in 2000 it had twenty-two cosponsors, but it only had five in 2001. Both times it was 
immediately referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means, and no further action was taken. 
H.R. 1872, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 4048, 106th Cong. (2000).  
 136.  Organ Transplant and Bone Marrow Donor Reauthorization: Hearing before the H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t, 103d Cong. 157 (1993) (statement of A. Bruce 
Bowden, Vice Chairman, National Kidney Foundation). 
 137.  See Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. On Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 51–54 (2003) 
[hereinafter Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations].  
 138.  EDWARD W. NELSON, UNOS ETHICS COMM., FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN 
DONATION: A REPORT OF THE UNOS ETHICS PAYMENT SUBCOMMITTEE (1993), available at 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4.  
 139.  See OPTN/UNOS Board Endorses Studies of Incentives to Increase Donation, TRANSPLANT 
LIVING (June 28, 2002), http://transplantliving.org/community/newsroom/2002/06/optn-unos-board-
endorses-studies-of-incentives-to-increase-donation/.  
 140.  Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 110. 
 141.  Putting Patients First: Increasing Organ Supply for Transplantation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Health & Env’t, of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 58 (1999). Joseph L. Brand, 
Chairman of the Office of Scientific and Public Policy at the National Kidney Foundation stated, “We 
have looked at this issue with our constituents and the bottom line is, we would support at least a pilot 
study on financial incentives.” Id. He went on, “Financial incentives, if we have any data that says they 
are working, we ought to try them elsewhere. So we certainly would support that . . . . The National 
Kidney Foundation has long called for demonstration projects to determine the impact of programs 
which would assist donor families in paying for funeral or burial expenses.” Id.  
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initiatives. The NKF expressed its support: “We are not talking about a 
situation where the organ goes to the highest bidder, or that there should 
be market for organs. We are talking about a limited, specified amount of 
money paid to a third party.”142 According to a spokesman for the American 
Society of Transplantation, that organization would be in favor of “carrying out 
creative pilot studies to explore the possibility that quite modest financial 
supports may enhance organ donation,” such as that offered by the 
Pennsylvania program.143 The president of the American Society of Transplant 
Surgeons (ASTS), also commenting on the Pennsylvania program, suggested 
that “if you would have asked this question 25 years ago . . . it would have been 
an absolute no . . . . but I think you have got to look at this again and again and 
again . . . .”144 He later confirmed, “I personally see no ethical issue.”145 John R. 
Campbell, executive director of the Lifelink Foundation (an OPO serving 
Florida, Georgia, and Puerto Rico) said, “We believe this will provide the organ 
donation and transplantation community an opportunity to view Pennsylvania 
as a pilot state for the rest of the nation . . . . If rates of donation increase, we 
may want to consider a similar initiative.”146 
In 2003, another congressional hearing was held to discuss strategies to 
increase the organ supply. A hearing entitled Assessing Initiatives to Increase 
Organ Donations was conducted before the House’s Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
Although strong objections were proffered against the use of direct monetary 
incentives to procure organs, many witnesses endorsed funeral support. The 
AMA representative, for example, encouraged “the medical community to 
support the reexamination of motivation for cadaveric organ donation,”147 as did 
the president of the ASTS,148 who testified about continuing interest in studying 
“various methods and programs to increase donation rates that may have a 
financial component,” such as offering “a modest funeral expense benefit to the 
family of a decedent donor, not as a payment for a donated organ, but as a 
token of thanks.”149 In their presidential addresses, ASTS Presidents in 2006 and 
2007 explicitly endorsed pilot trials of incentives for organ donation—both 
living and posthumous. 150 
 
 142.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pennsylvania Set to Break Taboo on Rewards for Organ Donations, 
N.Y.TIMES, May 6, 1999, at Al. 
 143.  Putting Patients First: Increasing Organ Supply for Transplantation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Health & Env’t, of the Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 80 (1999). 
 144.  Id. at 58.  
 145.  Id. at 74. 
 146.  Id. at 65. LifeLink’s strategies involved simplifying the donation process, improving the 
training of hospital employees who approach bereaved families for donor organs, and establishing a 
strong liaison program between hospitals and organ-procurement organizations. Id. at 14.  
 147.  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at 53–54. 
 148.  Id. at 62. 
 149.  Id. at 58 (statement of Abraham Shaked, President, American Society of Transplant 
Surgeons). 
 150.  See Richard N. Fine, Presidential Address at the 2006 World Transplant Congress (July 19, 
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When asked by Representative Greenwood what they thought of incentives, 
the president-elect of the Association of Organ Procurement Organizations 
(AOPO) stated that the AOPO would support pilot projects for incentives,151 
and the president-elect of UNOS said his organization “in essence . . . backed 
the AMA stance.”152 That same year, the AMA issued a report encouraging 
pilot trials of incentives for posthumous donation. The report mentioned 
funeral benefits as well as tax credits to the donor’s estate or a payment to a 
charity designated by the donor prior to death.153 Oddly, the NKF became 
opposed to the proposed initiatives, saying that “[a]ny attempt to assign a 
monetary value to the human body or its body parts, even in the hope of 
increasing organ supply, diminishes human dignity and devaluates the very 
human life we seek to save.”154 
In 2002, the Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation (ACOT) of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, whose role is to assist the HHS 
secretary in “[a]ssuring the public that the [transplant] system is as effective and 
equitable as possible,”155 recommended a demonstration project on incentives 
for deceased donations.156 During its 2004 meeting, ACOT considered the 
legality of fourteen different organ-donation incentive options, one of which 
was the payment of funeral expenses for deceased donors.157 The council found 
that a funeral-benefit program, although not clearly acceptable under NOTA, 
would be an “ideal” study and voted to keep the funeral-benefits concept under 
 
2006), http://www.myast.org/content/richard-n-fine-md-2006-presidential-address (“Is it wrong for an 
individual . . . who wishes to utilize part of his/her body for the benefit of another and in return will be 
provided with financial compensation that could obliterate a life of destitution for the individual and 
his/her family?”). Jeffrey Crippen of the American Society of Transplantation and Arthur Matas of the 
ASTS indicated support for financial-incentive trials in their presidential addresses at the Second 
World Transplant Congress. See Anthony Monaco, Financial Rewards for Organ Donation: Are We 
Getting Closer? 7 EXPERT REV. PHARMACOECONOMICS & OUTCOMES RES. 303 (2007). A poll taken 
at the annual meeting of the ASTS suggests considerable support for Fine’s sentiments, revealing that 
eighty to eighty-five percent of members were in favor of studying incentives for living donors. J.R. 
Rodrigue et al., Stimulus for Organ Donation: A Survey of the American Society of Transplant 
Surgeons, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2172 (2009). 
 151.  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at 22–23. 
 152.  Id. at 43.  
 153.  See FRANK A. RIDDICK, JR., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS 
3 (2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/2151a.pdf. The report 
also stated that “AMA policy has supported certain forms of financial incentives for cadaveric organ 
donation since 1993.” Id. at 1. 
 154.  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at 51–54. 
 155.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Mission and Meeting-Notes Archive of the Advisory 
Committee on Organ Transplantation, ORGANDONOR.GOV, 
http://organdonor.gov/legislation/advisory.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).  
 156.  Jim Warren, ACOT Recommends Set of Live Donor Standards; Spotlight Now on HHS 
Secretary Thompson’s Response, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Nov. 27, 2002, at P1. The ethics committee of the 
ASTS was in favor of a token reward to families who donate; this offer was explicitly meant as a “thank 
you,” not an inducement. See Jim Warren, ASTS Ethics Committee Endorses Pilot Program to Test a 
Financial Incentive to Increase Organ Donation, TRANSPLANT NEWS, May 28, 2002, at P1.  
 157.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Summary Meeting Notes from May 2004 Meeting, 
ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/legislation/acotmay2004notes.html (last visited Mar. 11, 
2014) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Summary Meeting Notes].  
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consideration. It concluded that “clarification and greater specificity [was 
needed] in regard to the broad and somewhat confusing prohibition of valuable 
consideration in the context of organ donation.”158 
Notably, ACOT recommended amending NOTA to give HHS discretion in 
further defining “valuable consideration.”159 It also noted that, “[r]egulatory 
authority is both more flexible and more responsive to innovation than an 
expanded statutory list of practices that are not included in the term ‘valuable 
consideration.’”160 The committee concluded “that a process to limit the scope 
of ‘valuable consideration’ would encourage the development of ethical 
practices to increase the supply of human organs and provide certainty to the 
transplant community about the scope of permissible activities.”161 
The council also listed the serious consequences of lack of clarity on the 
meaning of the term “valuable consideration.” They included, 
“Uncertainty about federal preemption of state law could deter state legislative action 
to create incentives intended to increase organ donation[;] 
Risk of criminal prosecution for innovative programs that provide incentives to 
increase donation[;] 
Federal preemption of state laws that create incentives to enhance donation on the 
grounds that the state law conflicts with the federal prohibition.”
162
 
In 2008, the AMA reasserted the legitimacy of studying incentives for 
deceased donation. The AMA House of Delegates voted in June to put the 
prospect of paying posthumous organ donors “high on its legislative agenda,” 
though the association appears to have done little to promote it among 
legislators.163 But the most far-reaching proposal yet came when the late Senator 
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania circulated a draft bill in 2008–2009, the Organ 
Donor Clarification Act, “to clarify that laws that honor and reward organ 
donation are not preempted by Federal criminal law and acceptance of such 
government benefits is not criminal.”164 Notably, the Specter proposal was not 
limited to deceased donation. The key language of his bill, which was never 
submitted, is as follows: 
The Federal and state governments enjoy constitutional powers to provide benefits 
that honor, reward, and encourage benevolent behavior deemed to be in the general 
welfare and public interest. The exercise of these sovereign powers to provide a 
benefit to those citizens who voluntarily donate the gift of life to fellow citizens is not 
commercial in nature, it does not constitute a commercial sales transaction, and it does 
not violate Federal law if a government program provides benefits, including, but not 
limited to, burial benefits, ‘‘gift of life’’ medals, tax credits for donors, tax credits for 
employers who pay lost wages, tax deductions, discounts or waivers of drivers’ license 
 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Recommendations 36-41 from November 2004 Meeting, 
ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/legislation/acotrecs3641.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id.  
 162.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Summary Meeting Notes, supra note 157.  
 163.  Kevin B. O’Reilly, AMA Meeting: Delegates Seek to Change Law on Organ Donor Incentives, 
AM. MED. NEWS, (July 7, 2008), http://www.amednews.com/article/20080707/profession/307079949/7/. 
 164.  Organ Donation Clarification and Antitrafficking Act of 2008, 111th Cong (2008). 
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fees, comprehensive health care for life, health and life insurance, disability and 
survivor benefits, a financial contribution to a charity of the donor’s choosing, the 
numerous benefits provided to veterans such as college tuition, or preference on the 
transplant waiting list for an individual who has donated an organ. 
Any government program that provides a benefit to honor, reward, and 
encourage organ donation should be devised and implemented in a manner 
consistent with the federal regulations that establish procurement, allocation, 
and transplantation protocols to prevent abuse, exploitation, or coercion.165 
An amendment to NOTA could extend exclusion from the definition to any 
in-kind material benefits provided by federal, state, or local government to an 
organ donor. Such a revision would create no federal mandate or allocation. It 
would simply open the door to states to experiment, a development that almost 
came to fruition in Pennsylvania. What is more, it would allow Congress to 
specify what the limits are on state programs, rather than having administrators, 
policymakers, and lawmakers guess about how courts will interpret the term 
“consideration.” 
As discussed above, one amendment to NOTA has been adopted. In 2007, 
Congress enacted the Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act to 
amend section 301 so that it explicitly exempted paired donations. If paired 
donations do not involve monetary compensation, they nonetheless enter into 
quid pro quo territory. Legal scholar Sherry Colb has argued that “in-kind 
markets” are already legal in the form of kidney swaps, arrangements that 
represent the exchange of kidneys for valuable things. In the case of paired 
exchange, that valuable thing happens to be a kidney.166 After all, she has 
argued, kidney swaps are driven by self-interest, not altruism. Should the fact 
that the currency in a paired exchange is compatible kidneys—rather than a tax 
credit, tuition voucher, or retirement supplement—place such exchanges in a 
completely different ethical category from ordinary market events? Colb has 
described two hypothetical women. First, there is Cathy—who seeks to 
exchange her kidney for a monetary reward, which she will use to pay for her 
husband’s life-saving surgery. And then Carla, who is biologically incompatible 
with her own husband but donates a compatible kidney to a recipient of another 
unmatched pair recipient (whose donor then gives his compatible kidney to 
Carla’s husband) thereby saving Carla’s spouse from dialysis and premature 
death. Carla cannot get her husband the kidney he needs with cash, so she uses 
her own kidney as currency instead. In both cases, a woman is giving a stranger 
a kidney that she would otherwise keep inside her own body. “In both cases,” 
Colb has written, “she is doing so because she prefers to part with a kidney than 
with her husband.”167 
Even beyond the paired donations allowed by the Norwood Act, newer 
 
 165.  Id. at § 2. 
 166.  See Sherry F. Colb, Donor Chains and the Legality of Compensating Kidney Donors: Critically 
Assessing Our Moral Intuitions, VERDICT (March 7, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/03/07/donor-
chains-and-the-legality-of-compensating-kidney-donors. 
 167.  Id. 
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arrangements, known as NEAD (nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic, donor) 
chains, might also be made available. Such chains comprise a number of 
unmatched pairs plus a nondirected altruistic donor, a stranger or good 
samaritan, who offers a kidney to someone chosen not by the donor but by the 
local transplant center or OPO. The nondirected donation kicks off a chain of 
transplants between the nonmatched pairs that may take many months to 
complete. The concept behind NEAD chains is that donors “pay it forward” 
after their loved one receives a transplant.168 Kieran Healy and Kimberly D. 
Krawiec situate NEAD chains in between a cascade of gift-giving and a 
sequence of formal contracts. Like swaps, chains rely on a norm of reciprocity, 
yet at the same time they “resemble a string of promises and commitments to 
deliver something in exchange for some valuable consideration – that is, a series 
of contracts,” as Healy and Krawiec put it.169 
In some respects, the Norwood Act was a bigger change to NOTA than a 
possible amendment authorizing funeral benefits. Paired donation is clearly a 
conditional arrangement in which a donor would never agree to act if a second 
donor did not promise to act as well. Then again, swaps and chains do not 
resemble commercial exchanges insofar as money is not being exchanged and 
all participants came to the swap arrangements because they possessed donative 
intent; that is, they were initially fully prepared to engage in a standard altruistic 
donation. However, whether or not the Norwood Act allows exchanges that are 
more or less commercial than state-benefit programs, does not affect the 
bottom line: State-benefit programs are consistent with NOTA section 301, and 
the section should be amended to make this clear. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
There likely does exist a realistic limit to the scope of any potential state 
benefit past which the state would be viewed as engaging in a business-type 
inducement contrary to the intent of NOTA. But reasonable benefits that are 
given by state governments to promote a policy of encouraging organ donation 
should not be interpreted as violating NOTA because these benefits are not 
clearly and definitively commercial and, as such, do not constitute “valuable 
consideration” as that term is commonly defined within the law. 
The legislative intent or policy rationales driving NOTA also do not counsel 
any different result. Much to the contrary, Congress’s intent in passing NOTA 
was to ban commercial exchanges of organs like those proposed by H. Barry 
 
 168.  Michael A. Rees et al., A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain, 360 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1096 (2009). Because the operations do not take place simultaneously, as they do with organ 
swaps, a concern is whether the donor half of an unmatched pair might renege on his or her promise to 
donate once the partner has already received a kidney. For discussion of contracting for damages as a 
way to foster commitment among participants, see Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, 
Contract, and Kidney Exchange, 62 DUKE L.J. 645 (2012). 
 169.  Id. at 645. 
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Jacobs—not to prohibit state-benefit programs. Similarly, the policy rationales 
underlying NOTA are not implicated by state-benefit programs. 
Canons of statutory construction further support reading NOTA section 301 
narrowly, thereby allowing for state-benefit programs. Inasmuch as NOTA 
section 301(a)’s ban is enforceable through criminal penalties, it should be read 
narrowly because the full scope of its meaning is not clearly evident from 
NOTA itself. State benefits for organ donation should not be interpreted to 
violate NOTA because federalism requires that leeway should be given and 
courts should be reluctant to preempt state authority in devising public-policy 
driven efforts to provide benefits to organ donors. Federalist analysis informs 
the NOTA question not just as part of a statutory canon, but also as a wider 
normative lens. 
The DOJ’s treatment of NOTA in the paired exchange context supports all 
that has been said above. The primary enforcer of NOTA section 301 has read 
that section narrowly. 
Of course, refreshing the statutory analysis of NOTA does little to solve the 
on-the-ground confusion in interpreting the law. Pennsylvania provides the test 
case. There, fear that NOTA banned state-benefit programs eventually scuttled 
an ambitious funeral-voucher program. To avoid this result in the future, an 
official interpretation should be acquired from the DOJ, or NOTA should be 
amended to expressly allow for state benefits. 
One final piece of supporting evidence: Both the public and experts are in 
favor of donor compensation. Polls and surveys reveal four trends: (1) among 
the general public, the majority either endorses in-kind donor rewards or is 
neutral; (2) the number of people who report that incentives make donation 
appear more attractive to them outnumber those who say that an incentive 
option would make them less likely to donate; (3) youthful cohorts are more 
receptive to incentives than their older counterparts; and (4) the public is more 
amenable to the idea than are medical professionals.170 In addition, many 
interest groups have endorsed the idea of pilot studies on government benefits 
to encourage organ donation. They include the HHS’s ACOT; UNOS;171 the 
AOPO; the American Association of Kidney Patients;172 the American Society 
of Transplantation; ASTS;173 and the AMA.174 However, none of these entities 
have pressed the matter or made it a priority. 
As a matter of historical significance, Representative Al Gore raised the 
possibility of incentives when he introduced NOTA in July 1983.175 It is also 
 
 170.  See supra note 12 and sources cited therein. 
 171.  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at22–23, 84. 
 172.  Interview of Thomas Peters, Member, AAKP Board of Directors (June 10, 2008).  
 173.  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at 84. 
 174.  See Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, Financial Incentives Could Improve Organ Donation and 
Reduce Donor-Recipient Gap (June 16, 2008), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/financial-incentives-could-improve-organ-donation-and-reduce-donor-recipient-gap-
57471977.html.  
 175.  Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t, supra note 41, at 9–10 
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noteworthy that he added section 301 not because of a deeply held belief that 
incentives were wrong, but because of the unhappy coincidence of his 
committee’s hearings on the bill with the sensational negative publicity 
attending the startup of an organ-brokerage firm in Virginia. But for that twist 
of fate, the middle ground between outright prohibition and unregulated 
markets would already have been sown with organ donor compensation 
programs, and tens of thousands of lives might have been saved in the last 
quarter century by an adequate supply of organs generated by appropriate 
financial incentives. 
 
(statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.). A bill to authorize the HHS secretary to carry out demonstration 
projects to increase the supply of organs donated for human transplantation, H.R. 2856, 108th Cong. 
(2003), had the support of no Republicans and five Democrats. Cosponsors were representatives 
Donna M. Christensen (D-VI), Martin Frost (D-TX), Rush D. Holt, (D-NJ), Donald M. Payne, (D-
NJ), and Vic Snyder (D-AR). 
